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The healthcare system in the United States has a 
sophisticated and an industry-unique set of legal 
requirements.  At the Federal level, healthcare 
entities, which capture personal identifying 
information (PII) and also financially bill customers, 
are under two major laws Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and 
Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Health Act (HITECH).  The HITECH law 
requires public notifications of healthcare breaches 
consisting of 500 or more individuals.  The 
notifications are posted to the US Health and Human 
Services (HHS) Office of Civil Rights (OCR) Breach 
Portal for the public to review.  This research 
analyzes the previous year of data posted to the HHS 
OCR portal to gain empirical insights into healthcare 
IT risks.  As risk informs budget, insurance 
allocations, and best practices, the real-live evidence 
analysis gives strong indicators of where stronger 
mitigating controls should be incorporated into the 
organizational Information Systems (IS) and overall 
healthcare infrastructure.   
 
1. Introduction  
Healthcare entities are under different laws at 
different levels of the government hierarchy—
International, Federal, State, and local.  The laws are 
essential since health is considered a basic human 
right; humans from all over the planet can potentially 
visit any healthcare entity  (United Nations, 2020).  
At the Federal level in the United States, there are 
two predominate laws for healthcare entities, the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA)  and the Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH). 
HIPAA was passed by Congress in 1996.  HIPAA 
was designed to achieve the following: (1) Provide 
the ability to transfer and continue health insurance 
coverage; (2) Reduce health care fraud and abuse; (3) 
Mandate industry-wide standards for health care 
information on electronic billing and other processes; 
and (4) Require the protection and confidential 
handling of protected health information. In 2009, the 
HITECH Act became part of the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA).  ARRA was created 
to motivate the implementation of electronic health 
records (EHR) and supporting technology in the 
United States  (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS), 2013).      
One of the requirements of HITECH is the public 
notification of healthcare breaches of personal 
identifying information (PII) if a breach effects 500 
or more individuals.  When a healthcare breaches this 
number of individuals, they can also be fined as part 
of a corrective action plan.  Both the notifications and 
the investigations can cause serious financial burdens 
exacerbated by both reputational damages and 
required infrastructure improvements.  In addition, 
patients whom have had their information breached 
may be at higher risks of identity theft. 
To improve mitigations against data breaches, this 
research examines the public notifications of PII 
breach trends to inform the healthcare entities of the 
most current risks around the United States.  These 
current risk trends inform organizations as to where 
they should be deeply (re)considering and 
(re)budgeting for risk mitigations (i.e. NIST 800-53 
risk controls  (NIST, 2020)) to protect their patients 
and their overall healthcare entity from data breaches.   
 
2. Literature Review 
There is very little literature in the cybersecurity 
and computer science domain considering the risks 
learned from an examination of the empirical data 
reported on the US HHS OCR Breach Portal.  
Schmeelk  (2019a) and Schmeelk  (Schmeelk, 2019b) 
analyzed the breach data on a 1-year interval between 
May 1, 2018 through May 1, 2019. The analysis 
reported on trends from breach factors reported to the 
government to further inform cybersecurity patient 
health data risk management. 







Dolezel and McLeod  (2019) examined the 
Department of Health and Human Services breach 
reporting portal public dataset from the first record 
on October 21, 2009 until October 8, 2018. 
Specifically, they analyzed the relationship between 
data breach characteristics and the number of 
individuals affected as protected by the HITECH law. 
The analyses revealed that the hacking/IT incident 
breach type and network server breach location were 
the most significant predictors of the number of 
individuals affected.  Their analysis showed that 
geographic region of a breach occurrence was 
insignificant. 
Bai, G., Jiang, J. X., & Flasher, R.  (2017) 
examined the hospital risk of data breaches from the 
data  reported to the HHS OCR between October 21, 
2009, and December 31, 2016.  Their research found 
that of the 1798 data breaches were reported, 1225 
breaches were reported by health care providers.  
Additionally, there were 257 breaches reported by 
216 hospitals in the data with at least 33 hospitals 
involved in more than one breach.  Of the breaching 
hospitals, the median number of beds was 262 and 52 
hospitals were major teaching hospitals.  
Liu, V., Musen, M. A., & Chou, T.  (2015) 
evaluated 949 breaches from the public HHS OCR 
HITECH breach dataset.  The breaches affected more 
than 29 million records between 2010 and 2013.  The 
researchers found that six breaches involved more 
than 1 million records each and the number of 
reported breaches increased over time.  All states 
were reported to have breached.  The researchers 
adjusted the breach numbers per state with the 
population estimates without finding significant 
patterns of state populations and breaches. 
 
3. US HHS OCR Data Breach Portal 
As required by section 13402(e)(4) of the 
HITECH Act, the HHS OCR Secretary must post a 
list of breaches of unsecured protected health 
information (e.g. patient health identifiers (PHI)) 
affecting 500 or more individuals.  This portals main 
page lists all breaches reported within the last 24 
months that are currently under investigation by the 
Office for Civil Rights (OCR). 
Currently the portal posts the following 
information: Breach Submission Date, Type of 
Breach, Location of Breach, Type of Covered Entity, 
State, Business Associate Present, and optionally a 
Description.  The types of breaches are listed the 
following categories: Theft, Hacking/IT Incident,  
Unauthorized Access/Disclosure, Improper Disposal, 
Loss, Unknown, and Other.  The locations of 
breaches are listed in the following categories: 
Desktop Computer, Electronic Medical Record, 
Email Laptop, Network Server, Other Portable 
Electronic Device, Paper/Films, and Other. 
 
4. A Look Back Risk Analysis 
This section reports on the last full 12-months of 
reported HHS OCR patient data breach information 
to inform on future risk trends and potential 
mitigations.   
 
4.1. Analysis By State 
Analyzing the full year of data breach records by 
state provides insight into which states were the 
riskiest last year.  The previous 1-year of data, as 
seen in Figure 1, indicates that Texas had 51 self-
reported breaches, the most self-reported breaches of 
the states.  California was second in the number of 
data breaches, self-reporting 41 data breaches.  Of the 
self-reported breaches, Puerto Rico, West Virginia, 
Wyoming, District of Columbia, and Rhode Island 
only reported one breach each.  The states of Idaho, 
Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, and Vermont did not self-report any breaches 
within the one-year interval. 
 
 
Figure 1: Data Breaches by States with BAAs 
 
4.2. Analysis By Individual 
The number of breaches is not connected to the 
number of individuals potentially compromised in a 
breach.  Examining the previous year of data 
breaches of individuals across the states, the District 
of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, we see that the top 
five states with the most affected individual’s records 
were the following: Minnesota breached the PII of 
11,590,390 individuals, Texas breached the PII of 
2,419,342 individuals, California breached the PII of 
1,042,144 individuals, Florida breached the PII of 
832,286 individuals and Oregon breached the PII of 
747,173 individuals.  A chart can be seen in Figure 2. 
 
 




4.3. Analysis by BAA 
 Business Associate Agreements (BAAs) should 
be put in place to protect a covered entity (i.e. health 
plans, health care clearinghouses, and certain health 
care providers) whenever an outside entity performs 
actions or functions on their behalf.  The HIPAA 
Privacy Rule only applies to covered entities, it 
requires that a covered entity obtain satisfactory 
assurances from its business associate that the 
business associate will appropriately safeguard the 
protected health information it receives or creates on 
behalf of the covered entity. The satisfactory 
assurances must be in writing, whether in the form of 
a contract or other agreement between the covered 
entity and the business associate.  After a breach 
originating with the business associate, if no BAA is 
in place, then both the business associate and the 
covered entity face corrective actions and fines.   
Figure 1 shows the split histogram of breaches 
where a BAA is present (histogram top orange color) 
and where a BAA is missing (histogram bottom blue 
color).  As can be seen, most breaches were reported 
without a BAA.  Specifically, of the 416 breaches 
reported between June 2019 and June 2020, no BAAs 
were present in 308 breaches and 108 breaches did 
indeed have BAAs in place.  This shows that there is 
higher risk that BAAs are not in place; the empirical 
evidence should justify budgeting for better processes 
to ensure that business associates conform to BAAs 
prior to processing PII on the covered entities’ behalf. 
 
 
Figure 3: Breach Entity Data Breach Count 
 
4.4. Analysis By Breach Entity 
Data breaches can occur within a health plan, 
health care clearinghouse, certain health care 
providers, and business associates.  Figure 3 shows 
the count of data breaches per entity from June 2019 
to June 2020.  As can be seen, the highest risks are 
from healthcare providers.  Specifically, the breach 
count per entity is as follows: Business Associates 
reported breaches 53 times, Health Plans reported 
breaches 34 times, Healthcare Clearing Houses 
reported breaches one time, and Healthcare Providers 
reported breaches 328 times.  Clearly, Healthcare 
providers are the entities that still need to allocate 
more budget and time to the protection of patient PII. 
 
4.5. Analysis by Breach Source 
 The breach portal categorizes breaches by source 
into five categories, as seen in Figure 4.  By far, the 
predominate methodology of loss of patient PII was 
hacking/IT incident.  Specifically, the reports for the 
year were the following: Hacking/IT Incident reports 
totaling 264 breaches, Improper Disposal totaling 12 
breaches, Loss totaling 11 breaches, Theft totaling  
27 breaches, and Unauthorized Access/Disclosure 
totaling 102 breaches.  The evidence shows that 
healthcare budgets should emphasize and perhaps 
increase budgets for mitigating controls of 




Figure 4: All Covered Entities by Breach by Type 
 
 
Figure 5: All Covered Entities by Breach Location 
 
The breach portal categorizes breaches by 
location into approximately 35 categories, as seen in 
Figure 5.  The top sources of the 416 reported data 
breaches were the following: Email had 172 reported 
breaches, Network Server had 74 reported breaches; 
Paper/Films had 42 reported breaches; Other had 27 
reported breaches; Electronic Medical Records had 
15 reported breaches; Network Server, Other had 15 
reported breaches;  Desktop Computer had 10 
reported breaches; Laptop had 10 reported breaches; 
Other Portable Electronic Device had 10 reported 
breaches;  Email, Network Server had 7 reported 
breaches; and Electronic Medical Record, Network 
Server had 5 reported breaches.  All the rest had one 
or two reported breaches in their source category.  




security budgets should amply include mitigating 
controls around email, network servers and the 
process for the disposal of paper/films records. 
 
4.5.1 Analysis by Health Plan 
 Managing risk in Health Plans is different than 
other covered entities as the risk threats and risk 
impact are different than other breached entities.  An 
examination of the breach sources only within the 
Health Plans 34 reported breaches reveals that there 
were only three categories of breaches reported as 
follows: Hacking/IT Incident reports totaling 19 
breaches, Unauthorized Access/Disclosure reports 
totaling 13 breaches, and Theft reports totaling 2 
breaches.  A histogram of the breaches by category 
can be seen in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6: Health Plan by Breach by Type 
 
Health Plans reported 34 breaches of which the 
most breach (i.e. 13) were sourced from email.  Each 
category of Network Server and Paper/Film breaches 
were reported as the source of five breaches.  All the 
other breach source categories had three or less 
reports.  A histogram of the breach categories for 
Health Plans can be seen in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7: Health Plan by Breach Location 
 
4.5.2 Analysis by Clearing House 
 Clearing Houses have different risks from the 
other covered entities as the processes, procedures 
and actual stored patient PII may be different than the 
other entities.  An examination of the one reported 
data breach within the Clearing House category, 
specifically a breach reported on March 20, 2020, by 
the Georgia Department of Human Services for 500 
individuals, indicates that the data was loss through 
Paper/Films categories, perhaps during an improper 
disposal of records.  Interestingly, in this particular 
case, the breach was not technology related for the 
data indicating that mitigating process controls 
should be amply budgeted for in Clearing Houses. 
 
4.5.3 Analysis by Business Associate 
 Business Associates also have unique risks as the 
risk elements of threats and impacts are different than 
other entities.  Business Associates reported 53 
breaches between June 2019 and June 2020.  Of the 
reports, the two highest categories of breach types 
were Hacking/IT Incident with 39 reports and 
Unauthorized Access/Disclosure with 11 reports, as 
seen in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8: Business Associate Breach by Type 
 
Business Associates reported that the most 
breaches occurred via Email with 27 reports.  The 
Network Server category had the second highest 
number of 12 reports.  The other categories had only 
one or two reports over the year, as seen in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9: Business Associate by Breach Location 
4.5.4 Analysis by Healthcare Provider 
 Healthcare Providers (HP) report 328 breaches 
from June 2019 to June 2020.  The highest category 




reports followed by Unauthorized Access/Disclosure 
with 78 reports.  A histogram of the reports can be 
seen in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10: Healthcare Providers by Breach Type 
 
Healthcare Providers breach reports indicate that 
Email was the number one source category at 132 
reports.  Then, Network Servers were the second 
most breach reported sources with 57 reports.  
Finally, Paper/Films were the third highest breach 
sources with 33 reports.  A histogram of the reports 
can be seen in Figure 11.   
 
 
Figure 11: HP by Breach Location 
 
4.5.5 Entity Analysis Source Summary 
 Examining each breach entity independently 
informs on the variations needed for risk 
management in the different entities.  Healthcare 
Providers clearly breach data from many different 
categories of locations than the other entities.  
However, all the entities share some of the top three 
breach types and sources. 
 
4.6. Case Studies: Top Breach Individuals 
 During June 2019 – June 2020, there were three 
top breaches.  First, Optum360, LLC., a Business 
Associate headquartered in Minnesota reported the 
breach of  11,500,000 individuals on July 1, 2019 due 
to Hacking/IT Incident of their Network Server. They 
did have BAAs in place for their patient data. 
The second largest breach of the year interval, 
was from Clinical Pathology Laboratories, Inc., 
which is a Healthcare Provider headquartered in 
Texas.  They reported the breach of 1,733,836 
individuals. on July 15, 2019 from Hacking/IT 
Incident on their Network Server.  There were no 
BAAs in place.  
The third largest breach of individuals reported 
during the 2019-2020 interval was from Health Share 
of Oregon, which is a Health Plan headquartered in 
Oregon.  The plan reported a breach of 654,362 
individuals on February 5, 2020 from Laptop Theft. 
 
4.7. Case Study: State with Most Breaches 
 Texas self-reported the most breaches in the June 
2019-2020 interval with 51 reports.  Of the reports, 
Healthcare Providers consisted of 46 reports, 
Business Associates with 4 reports, and one Health 
Plan report.  The reports of breach categories in the 
Texas Healthcare Providers matched the same 
distribution as the reports across the country seen in 
Figure 4.  Interestingly, examining the breach sources 
in the Healthcare Providers in Texas showed that the 
number one reported breach sources was the Other 
category with 15 reports, as seen in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12: Texas HP by Breach Location 
 
4.8. Case Study: Breach State with Least 
 Six states--Idaho, Mississippi, New Hampshire, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, and Vermont--did not 
self-report any data breaches within the one-year 
interval to the HHS OCR.  Three states, the District 
of Columbia, and the Puerto Rico Territory all self-
reported only one breach within the interval. 
In Puerto Rico, the Intramural Practice Plan of the 
Medical Sciences Campus of the University of Puerto 
Rico reported a breach on September 16, 2019.  The 
entity is considered a Healthcare Provider.  The self-
report indicated that 439,753 individuals were 
affected from a Hacking/IT Incident of a Network 
Server.  There was not a BAA in place, but perhaps 
one was not necessary.  Finding any further public 




On December 12, 2019, a Business Associate in 
the District of Columbia named Service Benefit Plan 
Administrative Services Corporation reported a 
breach.  They reported 11,536 records were involved 
in an Unauthorized Access/Disclosure of the Network 
Server.  They reported having BAAs in place.  
The Personal Touch Home Care of W. VA, Inc, a 
Healthcare Provider headquartered in West Virginia 
reported a breach on January 28, 2020.  The breach 
involved 1,169 records from a Hacking/IT Incident of 
a Network Server and Other category.  They report 
that BAAs were in place.  
In Wyoming, the Healthcare Provider Cheyenne 
Regional Medical Center reported a breach on 
December 10, 2019.  The Hacking/IT Incident 
breached 17,549 records sourcing from Email.  The 
organization reports not having a BAA in place; 
however, perhaps none were needed.  
In Rhode Island, the Rhode Island Ear, Nose and 
Throat Physicians Inc., reported a breach on August 
16, 2019 involving 2,943 records.  The entity is 
considered a Healthcare Provider, whom fell victim 
to a Hacking/IT Incident of their Network Server.  A 
BAA was not reported in place, but perhaps one was 
not needed.  
 
5. Discussion and Future Work 
Risks, threats, and impact change over time.  It is 
essential to review the notifications posted to the 
HHS OCR portal on an annual basis to inform current 
best practices for covered entities.  This paper 
contributes an analysis of risks reported to the portal 
between after June 30, 2019 until June 30, 2020.  We 
found that the number of self-reported breaches has 
no correlation with the number of records involved in 
a breach.  In the self-reported breach scenarios, a 
breach could involve over 11+ million individuals; 
whereas another breach could involve the public 
disclosure of the minimal 500 records.  Our analysis 
showed that different breach entities may have 
different risks involving breach type and breach 
location, informing entity operations for mitigating 
risks.  Lastly, we recommend a few updates to the 
HHS OCR portal including more information on 
exactly what type of PHI was breached (e.g. photos, 
email addresses, EMRs, etc.)  Currently, the burden 
is on the entity to publicly disclose to patients what 
was lost, but the US industry at large would benefit 
from knowing this to help developer further 
mitigating controls.  Another potential portal update 
would be to indicate if a BAA was indeed necessary, 
as a BAA is not always necessary.  Therefore, the 
portal’s current state, where there exists a binary 
categorical category for the presence of a BAA, may 
not be interpreted accurately from a risk perspective 
when a breach does not involve a business associate 
and indicates that a BAA was not present.  In this 
case, a BAA would not need to be present if no 
outside entity was involved in the reported breach. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The healthcare industry has moved to a risk 
management model, perhaps due to the Federal 
requirement of risk assessments for systems and 
processes involving PHI.  Currently the healthcare 
industry has not yet adopted  a standard risk 
framework library  (Schmeelk, 2020).  The adoption 
of such a framework would help unify associated 
breach cost estimates for insurance purposes and 
improve ad hoc risks assessments from reporting 
entirely different findings.  Lastly, adding additional 
elements to the public notifications such as the type 
of PII breached and if a BAA was necessary, could 
improve industry’s response to developing more 
accurate mitigating controls.  Data breaches can lead 
to identify theft which is a big problem for many 
individuals.  The more we focus our research on why 
data breaches are still occurring, the sooner we can 
mitigate the risks and lower the number of affected 
individuals.  
 
7. References  
National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST), (2020). NIST Special Publication 800-53. 




Bai, G., Jiang, J. X., & Flasher, R. (2017). 
Hospital Risk of Data Breaches. JAMA internal 
medicine, 177(6), 878–880. 
doi:10.1001/jamainternmed.2017.0336 
 
Dolezel, D. & McLeod, A. (2019). Cyber-
Analytics: Identifying Discriminants of Data 
Breaches. . Perspectives in Health Information 
Management(16(Summer):1a). 
 
Liu, V., Musen, M. A., & Chou, T. (2015). Data 
breaches of protected health information in the 
United States. JAMA, 313(14), 1471–1473. 
doi:10.1001/jama.2015.2252 
 
Schmeelk, S. (2020).  Creating a Standardized 
Risk Assessment Framework Library for Healthcare 
Information Technology.  HICSS-53: Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences 





Schmeelk, S. (2019a). Where is the Risk? 
Analysis of Government Reported Patient Medical 
Data Breaches. In IEEE/WIC/ACM International 
Conference on Web Intelligence - Companion 
Volume (WI ’19 Companion). Association for 
Computing Machinery,. New York, NY. 
doi:https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3358695.3361754 
 
Schmeelk, S. (2019b). Identity Theft: Anatomy of 
a Data Breach. New York, New York: Parsons - The 
New School for Design. 
 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS). (2013, July 26). HITECH Act Breach 
Notification Guidance and Request for Public 





United Nations. (2020). The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Retrieved November 
17, 2020 from: https://www.un.org/en/universal-
declaration-human-rights 
 
 
Page 3999
